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A Dynamic Scoring Simulation Analysis of How TEL Design Choices Impact Government Expansion

Author

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  • John D. Merrifield

    (University of Texas at San Antonio College of Business.)

  • Barry W. Poulson

    (University of Colorado at Boulder)

Abstract

A dynamic scoring simulation analysis compares the size-of-government effects of four state-government-level Tax and Expenditure Limit (TEL) and Budget Stabilization Fund (BSF) combinations. Two of the four TEL-BSF combinations have population-plus-inflation as the basis for the spending growth limit. The other two TEL-BSF combinations have personal-income-growth as the basis for the spending growth cap. A sensitivity analysis, including a regression analysis of Monte-Carlo-generated ‘observations’, measures the significance of the model parameter choices. The personal-income-growth TELs don’t constrain spending growth at all in some states. In most states, a TEL based on a significant multiple of population plus inflation restrains fiscal expansion more than either version of our personal income growth TEL. The findings provide some important policy issues: there are significant differences in the fiscal and economic impacts of likely TEL design alternatives, and there is a likely trade-off between stringency and political durability.

Suggested Citation

  • John D. Merrifield & Barry W. Poulson, 2016. "A Dynamic Scoring Simulation Analysis of How TEL Design Choices Impact Government Expansion," Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (JEFS), LAR Center Press, vol. 4(2), pages 60-68, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:lrc:lareco:v:4:y:2016:i:2:p:60-68
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Budget stabilization; Fiscal consolidation; Fiscal rules; State fiscal policy. TEL.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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