Commitment in Regulation: Defense Contracting and Extensions to Price Caps
AbstractDepartment of Defense regulation of weapons contracting uses incentive devices common to public utility regulation. This paper examines parallels between fixed-price contracts in weapons acquisition and the use of price caps to motivate public utilities. It uses defense contracting experience to identify limits to the efficiency and administrability benefits one can expect adoption of a price caps regime to produce in practice. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 3 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- William P. Rogerson, 2003. "Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 919-926, June.
- William P. Rogerson, 1993. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Discussion Papers 1078, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Weisman, Dennis L., 2002. "Is there 'Hope' for price cap regulation?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 349-370, September.
- Lulfesmann, Christoph, 2002. "Partial monitoring, adverse selection, and the internal efficiency of the firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1097-1118, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.