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Electricity Wheeling and Incentive Regulation

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  • Einhorn, Michael A

Abstract

This paper relates social contract regulation strategies to a particularly important contemporary issue in energy regulation--electricity wheeling; the authors find that substantial gains in economic efficiency may be possible. First, social contracts give potential wheelers more monetary incentive than traditional regulatory procedures to provide wheeling services to interested third parties. Second, social contract regulation gives potential wheelers better incentives to measure marginal costs accurately. Third, under social contract regulation, wheelers have proper incentives to install efficient amounts of transmission capacity, thereby avoiding Averch-Johnson and other regulatory distortions that emerge in traditional regulation. Copyright 1990 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Einhorn, Michael A, 1990. "Electricity Wheeling and Incentive Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 173-189, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:173-89
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    Cited by:

    1. Abdala, Manuel A., 2008. "Transmission pricing in privately-owned electricity grids: An illustration from the Argentine electricity pool," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1284-1305, July.
    2. Matsukawa, Isamu, 2008. "The effects of average revenue regulation on electricity transmission investment and pricing," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 696-714, May.
    3. isamu matsukawa, 2005. "Congestion pricing of inputs in vertically related markets," Industrial Organization 0506012, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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