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Experiencing Impartiality to Invoke Fairness in the n-PD: Some Experimental Results

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  • Frohlich, Norman
  • Oppenheimer, Joe A
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    Abstract

    Subjects play a 5-person Prisoner's Dilemma both from an impartial point of view and in a regular fashion to determine whether (1) Concerns for fairness increase cooperative behavior; (2) Play of a Prisoner's Dilemma from an impartial point of view results in significantly higher levels of cooperation than does normal play; (3) Concern for fairness has greater explanatory force in explaining cooperation in impartial plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma than in normal plays; and (4) Experience with impartial play of a Prisoner's Dilemma sensitizes subjects to normative imperatives and results in higher levels of cooperation in subsequent normal plays of Prisoner's Dilemmas. The first and second hypotheses are supported, the third is inverted, and the fourth is not supported. Concern for fairness is demonstrated to play a complex role in explaining cooperative behavior in regular plays of the game. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 86 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
    Pages: 117-35

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:86:y:1996:i:1-2:p:117-35

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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    Cited by:
    1. Burks, Stephen V. & Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Verhoogen, Eric, 2003. "Playing both roles in the trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-216, June.
    2. David Reinstein & David Hugh-Jones, 2010. "The Benefit of Anonymity in Public Goods Games," Economics Discussion Papers 689, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    3. Frohlich, Norman & Oppenheimer, Joe, 1998. "Some consequences of e-mail vs. face-to-face communication in experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 389-403, April.

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