Organizational Slack in Subsidized Nonprofit Institutions
AbstractInformal objectives of managers next to the formal objective of the organization can be a source of organizational slack or X-inefficiency in nonprofit organizations. If the organization is subsidized, the donor can restrain organizational slack by choosing an appropriate subsidy system. Four subsidy systems are discussed: output, input, revenue, and lump-sum subsidy. Output subsidy reduces slack most. The ranking of input subsidy compared with lump-sum subsidy depends on the elasticity of demand for output. Revenue subsidy equals input subsidy. Changes in the subsidy regime for residential adult education in the Netherlands turn out to have been inconsistent. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 81 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
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