The Dynamics of Lobbying--A Differential Game
AbstractThis paper presents a dynamic model on lobbying. The interactions between two competing lobbies, who attempt to influence regulations and legislation, are modeled as a differential game. The author considers for this game first a time-consistent and then a subgame-perfect equilibrium (in linear Markov strategies). The subgame-perfect equilibrium lowers considerably lobbying activity and expenses. This provides a partial explanation of the puzzle that rent-seeking expenses are often small compared with the prize sought. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 80 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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