When Groups Contribute to a Public Good: The Importance of Institutional Framework for Making Collective Decisions
AbstractIn this paper, the author discusses how the institutional framework for making collective decisions influences the outcome of a game where groups contribute to a public good. Representative democracy invites each group to act strategically in the election of representatives. The author shows that this strategic effect reinforces 'the tragedy of the common.' The society--all groups taken together--has, therefore, incentives to restrict groups from making collective decisions through a system of representation. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 80 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Torsvik, G., 1990. "When Groups Contribute to a Public Good: The Importance of Institutional Framework for Making Collective Decisions," Papers 15-90, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
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- Richard Cornes & Jun-ichi Itaya & Aiko Tanaka, 2011.
"Private Provision of Public Goods between Families,"
ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics
2011-542, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Richard Cornes & Jun-ichi Itaya & Aiko Tanaka, 2012. "Private provision of public goods between families," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 1451-1480, October.
- CORNES, Richard & ITAYA, Jun-ichi & TANAKA, Aiko, 2007. "Private Provision of Public Goods between Families," Discussion paper series. A 194, Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University.
- Gradstein, Mark, 1999. "Optimal taxation and fiscal constitution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 471-485, June.
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