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Crashing the Party: An Experimental Investigation of Strategic Voting in Primary Elections

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  • Cherry, Todd L
  • Kroll, Stephan

Abstract

The effect of primary formats on voting behavior and candidate fortune has been the topic of recent political, academic and legal arguments. We address these debates by examining voter behavior and election outcomes across primary systems in the laboratory. While we find the rate of strategic voting is generally low, the rate varies across primary formats and the potential impact on election outcomes differs from conventional perceptions. Results suggest that more open primary systems generate more strategic voting, but contrary to conventional wisdom, more open systems do not necessarily lead to more moderate election winners. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 114 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Pages: 387-420

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:114:y:2003:i:3-4:p:387-420

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Cited by:
  1. Oleg Smirnov, 2009. "Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 277-290, December.
  2. Peter Calcagno & Christopher Westley, 2008. "An institutional analysis of voter turnout: the role of primary type and the expressive and instrumental voting hypotheses," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 94-110, June.
  3. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation and Coalition Governments: A Simulation and Laboratory Experiment," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-55, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universit├Ąt Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

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