The Esteem Theory of Norms
AbstractWhen esteem is costless to supply, does it provide an effective means of enforcing norms for public goods production? I examine the basic mechanics of an enforcement-through-esteem model. While esteem may enforce norms to considerable degree, systematic underenforcement remains the general result, even in very basic settings with a minimum of transactions costs. I also examine why esteem has positive value in equilibrium if it can be produced costlessly (i.e., why esteem remains scarce), and what collective action problems plague the supply of esteem. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 113 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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