Incentive Contract and Weather Risk
AbstractWe study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 35 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
ecosystem service; incentive contract; moral hazard; risk; weather; D8; Q2;
Other versions of this item:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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