Judicial enforcement and caseload: theory and evidence from Brazil

We offer the first systematic inquiry into the role of caseload for efficacy of judicial enforcement, a critical but underexplored stage of the judicial process. We first develop a stylized model that elucidates the interrelated nature of judicial effort choice in enforcement versus adjudication. We then examine the model's prediction using data from labor courts in Brazil, where inefficacious judicial enforcement has been an enduring policy concern. Judicial efficacy at disposing enforcement cases is, as hypothesized, positively associated with both pending and newly filed enforcement cases, but, notably, negatively associated with pending adjudication cases. Thus, judges perceive the tasks of enforcement and adjudication as substitutes, not complements. We clarify the policy significance of this finding. More generally, our analysis demonstrates that assessment of judicial efficacy in one specific domain necessitates careful consideration of judicial caseload in all domains.