On the evaluation of power in parliaments and government formation
AbstractThis paper is devoted to the study of power in Parliaments. We explain how the power of coalitions can be computed after elections. We add to the existing literature by using this analysis to predict what government may emerge from these elections. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Power indices; Parliamentary method; Core; Coalition formation; C71;
Other versions of this item:
- Nicolas G Andjiga & Daoud Badirou & Boniface Mbih, 2006. "On the evaluation of power in Parliaments and government formation," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200618, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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