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It Pays to Be an Executive in Malaysia

Author

Listed:
  • Zahiruddin Ghazali
  • Fauziah Md. Taib

    (School of Economics, Finance and Banking, Universiti Utara Malaysia
    School of Management, Universiti Sains Malaysia)

Abstract

Malaysian corporate sector is characterized by an insider system of corporate governance and induced the alignment problems between majority shareholders and the minority group. This paper investigates if there is an evidence of moral hazard behaviour being practiced in the executive remuneration decision. A match pair methodology is employed to isolate the effect of ESOS adoption from the usual motivations when deciding executive remunerations. Results suggest that while the amount of remuneration is directly linked to size of firms suggesting efficient and rational decision rather than on performance (profitability). The moral hazard behaviour is more evident when firms reward their executives even more in times of lower profitability or more losses over a longer period. The practice is more apparent among family owned firms not adopting ESOS. Though there is evidence of weak monitoring by government, it is not enough to ward off the insider pressures for personal gains.

Suggested Citation

  • Zahiruddin Ghazali & Fauziah Md. Taib, 2015. "It Pays to Be an Executive in Malaysia," Journal of Developing Areas, Tennessee State University, College of Business, vol. 49(5), pages 225-237, Special I.
  • Handle: RePEc:jda:journl:vol.49:year:2015:issue5:pp:225-237
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    Cited by:

    1. Stettes, Oliver, 2016. "Arbeitswelt der Zukunft: Wie die Digitalisierung den Arbeitsmarkt verändert," IW-Analysen, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute, volume 108, number 108.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Governance; Executive Remuneration; Employee Shares Option Scheme and Interest Alignment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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