Does Croatia need a general anti-avoidance rule? Recommended changes to Croatia's current legislative framework
Abstract
This paper considers whether Croatia would benefit from the introduction of a general anti-avoidance rule into its tax system. The paper gives an overview of what tax avoidance is and differentiates the concept from the related concepts of tax evasion and fraud. The paper then describes how general anti-avoidance rules work. The paper gives an overview of Croatia’s tax system, including the measures the country already has to combat tax avoidance, and concludes that a general anti-avoidance rule is necessary. The paper draws on the experiences of countries with legal systems similar to that of Croatia to suggest the form that a Croatian general anti-avoidance rule should take.Download Info
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Article provided by Institute of Public Finance in its journal Financial Theory and Practice.
Volume (Year): 29 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 211-227
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Related research
Keywords: tax; tax avoidance; tax evasion; shams; Croatia; abuse of rights; general anti-avoidance rule; Constitution.;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bartelsman, Eric J & Beetsma, Roel, 2000.
"Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bartelsman, Eric J. & Beetsma, Roel M. W. J., 2003. "Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2225-2252, September.
- Eric J. Bartelsman & Roel Beetsma, 2000. "Why pay more? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-054/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Eric J. Bartelsman & Roel Beetsma, 2000. "Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 324, CESifo Group Munich.
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