Does Croatia need a general anti-avoidance rule? Recommended changes to Croatia's current legislative framework
AbstractThis paper considers whether Croatia would benefit from the introduction of a general anti-avoidance rule into its tax system. The paper gives an overview of what tax avoidance is and differentiates the concept from the related concepts of tax evasion and fraud. The paper then describes how general anti-avoidance rules work. The paper gives an overview of Croatia’s tax system, including the measures the country already has to combat tax avoidance, and concludes that a general anti-avoidance rule is necessary. The paper draws on the experiences of countries with legal systems similar to that of Croatia to suggest the form that a Croatian general anti-avoidance rule should take.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Institute of Public Finance in its journal Financial Theory and Practice.
Volume (Year): 29 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
tax; tax avoidance; tax evasion; shams; Croatia; abuse of rights; general anti-avoidance rule; Constitution.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eric J. Bartelsman & Roel Beetsma, 2000.
"Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
324, CESifo Group Munich.
- Bartelsman, Eric J. & Beetsma, Roel M. W. J., 2003. "Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2225-2252, September.
- Eric J. Bartelsman & Roel Beetsma, 2000. "Why pay more? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-054/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Bartelsman, Eric J & Beetsma, Roel, 2000. "Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 2543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martina Fabris).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.