Decentralized Trade Mitigates The Lemons Problem
AbstractIn markets with adverse selection, only low-quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low. We show that under decentralized trade, however, both high- and low-quality units trade, although with delay. Moreover, when frictions are small, the surplus realized is greater than the (static) competitive surplus. Thus, decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem. Remarkably, payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish, even though both high- and low-quality units continue to trade, and there is trade at several prices. Copyright (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 51 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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Other versions of this item:
- Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, . "Decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/783, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Diego Moreno & John Wooders, 2007. "Decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem," Economics Working Papers we071204, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
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