Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets
AbstractThis paper analyzes an agency problem where managers are able to control an unobservable variable that affects the time distribution of returns on a firm's investments. Managers have an incentive to select myopic investments in order to convince the labor market that they have relatively high ability. The authors demonstrate that, if employment terms are determined in competitive labor markets and there are lower bounds on compensations, then, at the principal's second-best contract, managers make a myopic investment choice. They also characterize the structure of the principal's second-best contract and conduct comparative statics at this solution. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 35 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Rim Zouari-Hadiji & Ghazi Zouari, 2010. "Gouvernance interne et investissement en R&D : une comparaison internationale," Working Papers FARGO 1100102, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
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