Taxpayers’Choices Under Studi Di Settore:What Do We Know And How We Can Interpret It?
AbstractStudi di settore (Sds) can be seen as a procedure that is midway between mechanisms of audit selection and methods of normal taxation. Its impact depends both on the efficiency of the audit selection criteria as well as on the strength of the political compromise that is built-in. This paper has three purposes. The first is to construct a simple model of the firm’s choice under Sds. The second is to use the model to discuss the stylized facts emerging from the implementation of Sds in the period 1998-2004. The third is to provide some policy indications to evaluate recent amendments to Sds.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University in its journal Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia.
Volume (Year): 67 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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Web page: http://www.gde.unibocconi.it/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
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- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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- Francesco Busato & Bruno Chiarini & Pasquale De Angelis & Elisabetta Marzano, 2008. "Firm-oriented policies, tax cheating and perverse outcomes," Discussion Papers 10_2008, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
- Carlo Fiorio & Stefano Iacus & Alessandro Santoro, 2013. "Taxpaying response of small firms to an increased probability of audit: some evidence from Italy," Working Papers 251, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2013.
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