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Taxpayers’Choices Under Studi Di Settore:What Do We Know And How We Can Interpret It?

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  • Alessandro Santoro

    ()
    (Università degli studi di Milano-Bicocca e Econpubblica(Università Bocconi))

Abstract

Studi di settore (Sds) can be seen as a procedure that is midway between mechanisms of audit selection and methods of normal taxation. Its impact depends both on the efficiency of the audit selection criteria as well as on the strength of the political compromise that is built-in. This paper has three purposes. The first is to construct a simple model of the firm’s choice under Sds. The second is to use the model to discuss the stylized facts emerging from the implementation of Sds in the period 1998-2004. The third is to provide some policy indications to evaluate recent amendments to Sds.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University in its journal Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia.

Volume (Year): 67 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 161-184

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Handle: RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v67_n2_p161-184

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Keywords: H25; H26; K42;

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Cited by:
  1. Bruno Chiarini & Simona Monteleone, 2011. "Discretionary policy, strategic complementarity and tax evasion. A strategic analysis of the Italian audit mechanism," Discussion Papers 4_2011, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
  2. Eduardo Zilberman, 2011. "Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self-Employment Income Taxes," Textos para discussão 590, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  3. Bruno Chiarini & Elisabetta Marzano & Friedrich Schneider, 2013. "Tax rates and tax evasion: an empirical analysis of the long-run aspects in Italy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 273-293, April.
  4. Bruno Chiarini & Elisabetta Marzano & Friedrich Schneider, . "Tax rates and Tax evasion: an Empirical Analysis of the Structural Aspects and Long-Run Characteristics in Italy," Working Papers wp2009-1, Department of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy and of Finance.
  5. Francesco Busato & Bruno Chiarini & Pasquale De Angelis & Elisabetta Marzano, 2008. "Firm-oriented policies, tax cheating and perverse outcomes," Discussion Papers 10_2008, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
  6. Carlo Fiorio & Stefano Iacus & Alessandro Santoro, 2013. "Taxpaying response of small firms to an increased probability of audit: some evidence from Italy," Working Papers 251, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2013.

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