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Discretionary policy, strategic complementarity and tax evasion. A strategic analysis of the Italian audit mechanism

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  • Bruno Chiarini
  • Simona Monteleone

Abstract

Underlying this work is the idea that there is a problem of strategic complementarity of individuals who choose to evade. Complementarity results from the discretionary policies of governments and the strategic implications of the Studi di Settore (Sector Studies), the mechanism used in Italy to evaluate the income (in reality, the turnover) of professional categories and small firms. In the Italian case, policy discretion and the Sector Studies lead to a failure of the coordination mechanism of taxpayers and confer a strong advantage for the coordination mechanism of tax evaders. The outcome is a coordination failure where individuals converge to the least efficient equilibrium from a social perspective.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy in its series Discussion Papers with number 4_2011.

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Date of creation: 29 Apr 2011
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Handle: RePEc:prt:dpaper:4_2011

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Keywords: Tax Evasion; Tax Compliance; Audit Selection Mechanism; Complementarity.;

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References

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  1. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2001. "Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 495.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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Cited by:
  1. Busato, Francesco & Chiarini, Bruno & Rey, Guido M., 2012. "Equilibrium implications of fiscal policy with tax evasion: A long run perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 197-214.

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