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Coevolution of Cooperation, Response to Adverse Social Ties and Network Structure

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Author Info

  • Sven Van Segbroeck

    (COMO, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
    MLG, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Boulevard du Triomphe–CP 212, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
    GADGET, Apartado 1329, 1009-001, Lisboa, Portugal)

  • Francisco C. Santos

    (CENTRIA, Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal
    ATP-group, CMAF, Complexo Interdisciplinar, Av. Prof. Gama Pinto, 21649-003 Lisboa, Portugal
    GADGET, Apartado 1329, 1009-001, Lisboa, Portugal)

  • Jorge M. Pacheco

    (ATP-group, CMAF, Complexo Interdisciplinar, Av. Prof. Gama Pinto, 21649-003 Lisboa, Portugal
    Departamento de Matemática e Aplicações, Universidade do Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
    GADGET, Apartado 1329, 1009-001, Lisboa, Portugal)

  • Tom Lenaerts

    ()
    (COMO, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
    MLG, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Boulevard du Triomphe–CP 212, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
    GADGET, Apartado 1329, 1009-001, Lisboa, Portugal)

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    Abstract

    Human social networks reshape continuously, as individuals forge new contacts while abandoning existing ones. Simultaneously, individuals adapt their behavior, leading to an intricate interplay been network evolution and behavior evolution. Here, we review a framework, called Active Linking, which allows an analytical treatment of such a co-evolutionary dynamics. Using this framework we showed that an increase in the number of ways of responding to adverse interactions leads an overall increase of cooperation, which is here extended to all two-player social dilemmas. In addition, we discuss the role of the selection pressure in these results.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.

    Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 317-337

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    Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:3:p:317-337:d:9625

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    Web page: http://www.mdpi.com/

    Related research

    Keywords: social dilemmas; cooperation; evolutionary game theory; dynamical networks; coevolution; selection pressure;

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    Cited by:
    1. Faqi Du & Feng Fu, 2011. "Partner Selection Shapes the Strategic and Topological Evolution of Cooperation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 354-369, September.

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