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A Method for Distributed Control of Reactive Power and Voltage in a Power Grid: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Ikponmwosa Idehen

    (Electrical & Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77840, USA)

  • Shiny Abraham

    (Electrical & Computer Engineering, Seattle University, Seattle, WA 98122, USA)

  • Gregory V. Murphy

    (Electrical Engineering, Tuskegee University, Tuskegee, AL 36088, USA)

Abstract

The efficiency of a power system is reduced when voltage drops and losses occur along the distribution lines. While the voltage profile across the system buses can be improved by the injection of reactive power, increased line flows and line losses could result due to uncontrolled injections. Also, the determination of global optimal settings for all power-system components in large power grids is difficult to achieve. This paper presents a novel approach to the application of game theory as a method for the distributed control of reactive power and voltage in a power grid. The concept of non-cooperative, extensive = form games is used to model the interaction among power-system components that have the capacity to control reactive power flows in the system. A centralized method of control is formulated using an IEEE 6-bus test system, which is further translated to a method for distributed control using the New England 39-bus system. The determination of optimal generator settings leads to an improvement in load-voltage compliance. Finally, renewable-energy (reactive power) sources are integrated to further improve the voltage-compliance level.

Suggested Citation

  • Ikponmwosa Idehen & Shiny Abraham & Gregory V. Murphy, 2018. "A Method for Distributed Control of Reactive Power and Voltage in a Power Grid: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-22, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jeners:v:11:y:2018:i:4:p:962-:d:141640
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kuhn, H.W. & Harsanyi, J.C. & Selten, R. & Weibull, J.W. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Nash Jr, J.F. & Hammerstein, P., 1995. "The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory," Other publications TiSEM fe698573-e6d1-4080-866e-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tianyao Zhang & Diyi Chen & Jing Liu & Beibei Xu & Venkateshkumar M, 2020. "A Feasibility Analysis of Controlling a Hybrid Power System over Short Time Intervals," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(21), pages 1-21, October.
    2. Liaqat Ali & S. M. Muyeen & Hamed Bizhani & Arindam Ghosh, 2019. "Comparative Study on Game-Theoretic Optimum Sizing and Economical Analysis of a Networked Microgrid," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-14, October.
    3. Arnob Ghosh & Vaneet Aggarwal, 2020. "Penalty Based Control Mechanism for Strategic Prosumers in a Distribution Network," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-14, January.

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