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Substitutes for Voting Rights: Evidence From Dual Class Recapitalizations

Author

Listed:
  • R. Charles Moyer
  • Ramesh Rao
  • Phillip M. Sisneros

Abstract

We offer additional insights regarding the motivation for dual class recapitalizations and their potential impact on managerial entrenchment. We test the general hypothesis that the loss of shareholder monitoring associated with dual class recapitalizations is replaced by alternative monitoring mechanisms. Evidence is found supporting an increase in the use of outside directors and an increase in the use of debt leverage in response to these recapitalizations. Evidence of increased monitoring by financial analysts and institutional investors also is reported, although the casual link to dual class recapitalization transactions is less clear.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Charles Moyer & Ramesh Rao & Phillip M. Sisneros, 1992. "Substitutes for Voting Rights: Evidence From Dual Class Recapitalizations," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 21(3), Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:moyer92
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Surjit Tinaikar, 2014. "Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure: an analysis of dual class firms," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(2), pages 373-417, May.
    2. Odegaard, Bernt Arne, 2007. "Price differences between equity classes. Corporate control, foreign ownership or liquidity?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3621-3645, December.
    3. Shivan Sarpal, 2015. "Determinants of Corporate Board Independence: Empirical Evidence from India," Management and Labour Studies, XLRI Jamshedpur, School of Business Management & Human Resources, vol. 40(1-2), pages 52-74, February.
    4. Cao, Xiaping & Leng, Tiecheng & Goh, Jeremy & Malatesta, Paul, 2020. "The innovation effect of dual-class shares: New evidence from US firms," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 347-357.
    5. Kai Li & Hernán Ortiz‐Molina & Xinlei Zhao, 2008. "Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual‐Class Firms," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 713-745, December.
    6. Jordan, Bradford D. & Liu, Mark H. & Wu, Qun, 2014. "Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 1-19.
    7. Robert L. Lippert & William T. Moore, 1994. "Compensation Contracts Of Chief Executive Officers: Determinants Of Pay-Performance Sensitivity," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 321-332, September.
    8. Ting Li & Nataliya Zaiats, 2018. "Corporate governance and firm value at dual class firms," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 47-71, January.
    9. Ehrhardt, Olaf & Nowak, Eric, 2001. "Private benefits and minority shareholder expropriation: Empirical evidence from IPOs of German family-owned firms," CFS Working Paper Series 2001/10, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    10. Amoako-Adu, Ben & Smith, Brian F., 2001. "Dual class firms: Capitalization, ownership structure and recapitalization back into single class," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1083-1111, June.

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