Water policy in California and Israel
AbstractWater policies throughout the world often avoid market-determined allocations. In this article, we focus on case studies of Israel and California. Despite major cultural and political differences, it is found that water is heavilty controlled through similar administrative mechanisms in both areas. Moreover, in both cases, these controls have led to inefficient allocation schemes favoring agriculture at the expense of other uses. This article examines the institutional factors that have led to such controls, and argues that adopting a new regulatory framework similar to that used to regulate electricity can still meet social concerns while dramatically improving economic efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its journal Economic Review.
Volume (Year): (1993)
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- Ronald H. Schmidt, 1987. "Deregulating electric utilities: issues and implications," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Sep, pages 13-26.
- Hoag, Dana L. & Conradie, Beatrice, 2003. "The Cost Of Meeting Equity: Opportunity Cost Of Irrigation In The Fish-Sundays Scheme Of South Africa," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25832, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
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