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Absolute priority rule violations in bankruptcy

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Author Info

  • Stanley D. Longhofer
  • Charles T. Carlstrom

Abstract

An examination of the impact of APR violations, demonstrating that the efficiency of such violations depends on the specific contracting problem with which a firm and its creditors are faced, and that as a result, an optimal bankruptcy institution should allow contract participants to decide ex ante whether such violations will occur.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its journal Economic Review.

Volume (Year): (1995)
Issue (Month): Q IV ()
Pages: 21-30

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1995:i:qiv:p:21-30

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Related research

Keywords: Bankruptcy ; Corporations - Finance;

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Cited by:
  1. Bertrand Chopard, 2005. "« Ex post » vs « Ex ante » : le cas de l’économie du droit de la faillite," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 81(4), pages 291-303.
  2. Tom Fischer, 2010. "No-arbitrage pricing under cross-ownership," Papers 1005.0768, arXiv.org.
  3. Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Agnès Fimayer & Jean-Daniel Guigou, 2007. "Financial versus Social Efficiency of Corporate Bankruptcy Law: the French Dilemma?," LSF Research Working Paper Series 07-02, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
  4. Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Agnès Fimayer & Jean-Daniel Guigou, 2009. "Financial versus Social Efficiency of Corporate Bankruptcy Law: the French Dilemma?," Working Papers of BETA 2009-12, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  5. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1997. "Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency," Working Paper 9710, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

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