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An Overview of Takeover Defenses and the Characteristics of the Economy

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  • Isidora Tachmatzidi

Abstract

Purpose: The present paper offers an overview of takeover defenses and an analysis of the way in which economic structures and characteristics may influence the presence of takeovers and takeover defenses. Design/Methodology/Approach: A brief definition of takeovers and takeover defenses is presented, followed by a thorough analysis of the different types of takeover defenses, frustrating and defensive actions. Then, there is an analysis of the economic structures and characteristics that may influence the employment of takeovers and defenses as well as their in-between interaction. Findings: In economies which have dispersed ownership structures, contestability and higher investment strategies more hostile takeovers tend to occur and consequently, takeover defenses, whereas economies in which ownership is more concentrated takeovers are not employed frequently. Practical Implications: The present article aims to offer a clarification on the interaction between takeover defenses and characteristics of the economy. Also, the analysis indicates the importance of the regulatory framework regarding these issues, taking into consideration the differences in the structure of the economies. Originality/Value: It provides the framework to develop potential regulation and policies regarding takeovers and takeover defenses in order to promote EU harmonization and global cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Isidora Tachmatzidi, 2020. "An Overview of Takeover Defenses and the Characteristics of the Economy," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 10(4), pages 40-49.
    • Handle: RePEc:ers:ijfirm:v:10:y:2020:i:4:p:40-49
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Isidora Tachmatzidi, 2017. "Takeover Defenses in the Greek Economy," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(4), pages 133-145.
    2. repec:ers:journl:v:vi:y:2018:i:4:p:105-118 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Marc Goergen, 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 21(2), pages 243-268, Summer.
    4. repec:ers:journl:v:v:y:2017:i:4:p:133-145 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Isidora Tachmatzidi, 2018. "Takeover Defenses in the United Kingdom," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(4), pages 105-118.
    6. Isidora Tachmatzidi, 2019. "Comparative Analysis of Takeover Defenses in Strong and Weak Economies: The Paradigm of the UK and Greece," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(2), pages 254-264.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Takeovers; takeover defenses; legal framework; economy structure; hostile takeovers; frustrating actions; defensive actions; market for corporate control; ownership structure; EU; Eurozone; Brexit; dispersed structure; concentrated structure; contestability; strong economy; weak economy; privatisation; investments.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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