Discretionary transfers in Indian federal finance: a panel data analysis

Purpose - Despite existence of a constitutional demarcation of functions and finances between the centre and the states, it is alleged that the centre-state funds transfer systems in India have a political bargaining aspect that goes beyond the normative considerations. This paper makes an attempt to investigate if the political system allows to evolve a simple, equitable, objective and rule-based system of transfers. The aim of this paper is to explore the political economic determinants of discretionary fiscal transfers in India. Design/methodology/approach - This paper is based on a panel data set of 28 Indian states for the period 2001–2014. After diagnostic checking for fixed effects/random effects, the authors prefer to use fixed effects regression with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors and Arellano–Bover/Blundel and Bond system estimation model that uses moment conditions in which lagged first differences of the dependent variable are instruments for the level equation. Findings - The findings of this study reveal that fiscal performance, economic capacity and political alliance are significant but some other political determinants such as bargaining power and election years are not significant in influencing discretionary transfers. Originality/value - Considering the limited availability of literature on federal finance, the present paper is an addition to the existing research, especially on a crucial issue concerning extra-constitutional fiscal transfers in India. Analysing a balanced panel comprising all the Indian states and examining the role of various political-economic determinants makes this paper topical.