Asset Specificity, Long-Term Contracts, and the Good Faith Requirement
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of court intervention on the choice between contracts and vertical integration when a specialized investment is required for least-cost production. It shows that: 1) differences in subjective probability estimates of the future bargaining power may cause the parties to contract when they should integrate and vice versa; 2) court intervention in the form of the good faith requirement improves efficiency by reducing the degree to which a shift in bargaining power allows a contractor to take a larger share of the gains to the contract and by compensating for differences in expected bargaining power; and 3) as the average difference between the buyer's and seller's estimates of future bargaining power increase, the net benefits of the good faith requirement rise.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 24 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Pages: 475-493
Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/o Dr. Alexandre Olbrecht, The Anisfield School of Business 205, Ramapo College, 505 Ramapo Valley Road, Ramapo, New Jersey 07430, USA
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Email:
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
More information through EDIRC
Related research
Keywords: Contracts; Vertical Integration;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
References
No references listed on IDEASYou can help add them by filling out this form.
Citations
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:24:y:1998:i:4:p:475-493For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

