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AbstractIn the wake of the S&L debacle, the LDC crisis and other systemic banking shocks, several recent proposals have called for regulatory reforms that emphasize the development of market incentives for both bankers and regulators. This article suggests that market-based reform may be feasible and desirable. In the absence of effective regulatory bodies, early nineteenth-century Americans relied on two specialized players in the financial market--banknote reporters and banknote brokers--for bank monitoring and information provision. Historical evidence provided by these banknote reporters suggests that reporters and brokers efficiently priced bank default risks. Brokers typically downgraded the debt issues of a troubled banks two years prior to its failure. In other cases, brokers often downgraded a bank's debt, forcing the bank to shape up and causing neither the particular bank's failure nor a widespread bank run. Finally, a formal test based on the so-called market model supports the contention that markets can effectively monitor financial institutions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 24 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
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Postal: c/o Dr. Alexandre Olbrecht, The Anisfield School of Business 205, Ramapo College, 505 Ramapo Valley Road, Ramapo, New Jersey 07430, USA
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
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Bank; Banking; Financial Markets; S&L;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
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- Bodenhorn, Howard, 2008.
"Free banking and bank entry in nineteenth-century New York,"
Financial History Review,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(02), pages 175-201, October.
- Howard Bodenhorn, 2004. "Free Banking and Bank Entry in Nineteenth-Century New York," NBER Working Papers 10654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hicham Chetioui & Olivier Brossard, 2003. "Histoire longue : la naissance de la réglementation prudentielle, 1800-1945," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 73(4), pages 13-37.
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