Public preferences over efficiency, equity and autonomy in vaccination policy: An empirical study
AbstractVaccination programs increasingly have to comply with standards of evidence-based decision making. However, such a framework tends to ignore social and ethical sensitivities, risking policy choices that lack crucial public support. Research is needed under which circumstances and to which extent equity and autonomy should prevail over effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in matters of infectious disease prevention. We report on a study investigating public preferences over various vaccination policy options, based on a population survey held in Flanders, Belgium (N = 1049) between March and July 2011. We found (1) that public support varied considerably between policies that were equally efficient in preventing disease but differed according to target group or incentives to improve uptake and (2) that preferences over the use of legal compulsion, financial accountability or the offering of rewards appear to be driven by individuals' social orientation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Social Science & Medicine.
Volume (Year): 77 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/315/description#description
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