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Intentions and ethical behavior in trust games

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Listed:
  • Lacour, Pierre

Abstract

This paper explores if knowledge of one's partner's intention affects cooperative behavior. Results of a trust game experiment show that Player 1's elicited intentions are consistent over an imperfect information treatment, when Player 2 is not aware of her partner's intention, and a perfect information treatment, when she knows it. Evidence highlights that people's intentions on one side of the games shape their beliefs as to how their partner wants them to act when the roles are reversed. Moreover, in the perfect information treatment, participants act in a manner consistent with their own intentions, suggesting that ethical considerations permeate behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Lacour, Pierre, 2012. "Intentions and ethical behavior in trust games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 55-63.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:41:y:2012:i:1:p:55-63
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2011.10.016
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trust; Cooperation; Intention; Belief; Ethics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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