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Intertemporal properties of an international carbon tax

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  • Hoel, Michael
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.

    Volume (Year): 15 (1993)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 51-70

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:15:y:1993:i:1:p:51-70

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569

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    Cited by:
    1. Michael Toman & Karen Palmer, 1997. "How should an accumulative toxic substance be banned?," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(1), pages 83-102, January.
    2. Bård Harstad, 2010. "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," CESifo Working Paper Series 2962, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Johan Eyckmans & Henry Tulkens, 1999. "Simulating with RICE Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 228, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Emilio Calvo & Santiago J. Rubio, 2012. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0112, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    5. Klaus Conrad, 2001. "The Optimal Path of Energy and CO2 Taxes for Intertemporal Resource Allocation," CESifo Working Paper Series 552, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Toman, Michael A. & Withagen, Cees, 2000. "Accumulative pollution, "clean technology," and policy design," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 367-384, October.
    7. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2002. "Selective Penalization Of Polluters: An Inf-Convolution Approach," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-40, CIRANO.
    8. A. Michaelowa, 1996. "Incentive Aspects of Joint Implementation of Greenhouse Gas Reduction," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 95-108, January.
    9. Santiago J. Rubio & Luisa Escriche, 1998. "- Strategic Pigouvian Taxation, Stock Externalities And Polluting Non-Renewable Resources," Working Papers. Serie EC 1998-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    10. Wie, Jiegen & Wennlock, Magnus & Johansson, Daniel J.A. & Sterner, Thomas, 2011. "The Fossil Endgame: Strategic Oil Price Discrimination and Carbon Taxation," Discussion Papers dp-11-26, Resources For the Future.
    11. Wirl, Franz & Dockner, Engelbert, 1995. "Leviathan governments and carbon taxes: Costs and potential benefits," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 1215-1236, June.
    12. Wang, Yiming, 2013. "A time-consistent model for cooperation in international pollution control," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 500-506.
    13. Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2014. "Strategic Carbon Taxation and Energy Pricing: The Role of Innovation," Working Papers in Economics 589, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    14. Toman, Michael & Kolstad, Charles, 2000. "The Economics of Climate Policy," Discussion Papers dp-00-40, Resources For the Future.
    15. Franz Wirl, 1995. "The exploitation of fossil fuels under the threat of global warming and carbon taxes: A dynamic game approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(4), pages 333-352, June.
    16. Akihiko Yanase, 2005. "Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 84(3), pages 277-311, 05.
    17. Sudhir A. Shah, 2006. "A Non-Cooperative Theory Of Quantity-Rationing International Transfrontier Pollution," Working papers 143, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

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