The myth of congressional supervision of monetary policy
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.
Volume (Year): 4 (1978)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566
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- Francisco Rosende, 1997. "La Autonomía del Banco Central una Vez Más," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 34(101), pages 3-26.
- Benjamin M. Friedman, 1980. "Postwar Changes in the American Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 0458, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chopin, Marc C. & Cole, C. Steven & Ellis, Michael A., 1996. "Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy: A reconsideration of the evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 561-570, December.
- James Forder, 2005. "The limits of `independence' and the policy of the ECB^," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 431-444, December.
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