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On the upper and lower semicontinuity of the Aumann integral

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  • Yannelis, Nicholas C.

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  • Yannelis, Nicholas C., 1990. "On the upper and lower semicontinuity of the Aumann integral," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 373-389.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:19:y:1990:i:4:p:373-389
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    Cited by:

    1. John Duggan, 2011. "Noisy Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 562, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    2. John Duggan, 2011. "Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria," Wallis Working Papers WP62, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    3. Duggan, John, 2017. "Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 111-126.
    4. Noguchi, Mitsunori, 1997. "Economies with a continuum of agents with the commodity-price pairing (l[infin], l1)," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 265-287, October.
    5. M. Ali Khan & Metin Uyanik, 2021. "The Yannelis–Prabhakar theorem on upper semi-continuous selections in paracompact spaces: extensions and applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 799-840, April.
    6. John Duggan, 2012. "Noisy Stochastic Games," RCER Working Papers 570, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    7. Page, F H, Jr, 1991. "Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Principal-Agent Problems with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(4), pages 323-338, October.
    8. Xiang Sun & Yongchao Zhang, 2015. "Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 161-182, January.

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