Monitoring policies to prevent oil spills: lessons from the theoretical literature
AbstractThis paper analyzes the policies implemented by the US Coast Guard for regulating transfers of oil in US harbors, specifically, we evaluate those monitoring and enforcement programs aimed at ensuring that the necessary levels of care and maintenance are observed during the routine transfer of oil between shore facilities and either tankers or barges. Our aim is to bring to the attention of policy makers and others interested in the regulation of pollution some of the insights to be gained from dynamic game theory. In particular, we discuss the punitive value of selective and repeated monitoring, which can be used as a cheap way of enforcing observance of regulations. We conclude with some suggestions for policy improvements.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.
Volume (Year): 27 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Oil spills Monitoring and inspection policy Pollution prevention Transfer operations;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.