Optimal cities with indivisibility in production and interactions between firms
AbstractA spatial model of cities is constructed by combining interaction costs between firms with indivisibility in production. The optimal allocation requires Pigouvian subsidies to firms and the externality version of the Henry George Theorem is obtained: at the optimal city size, the total Pigouvian subsidy equals the total differential land rent in a city. We also obtain conditions under which monocentric configuration is optimal and perform comparative statics concerning changes in various parameters on the optimal city size.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Urban Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905
Other versions of this item:
- Yoshitsugu Kanemoto, 1985. "Optimal Cities with Indivisibility in Production and Interactions Between Firms," Working Papers 597, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L68 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Appliances; Furniture; Other Consumer Durables
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- Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu, 2013.
"Second-best cost–benefit analysis in monopolistic competition models of urban agglomeration,"
Journal of Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 83-92.
- Yoshitsugu Kanemoto, 2012. "Second-Best Cost-Benefit Analysis in Monopolistic Competition Models of Urban Agglomeration," GRIPS Discussion Papers 11-21, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
- Yoshitsugu Kanemoto, 2011.
"Second-Best Cost?Benefit Analysis with a Microfoundation of Urban Agglomeration,"
GRIPS Discussion Papers
11-03, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
- Yoshitsugu Kanemoto, 2011. "Second-Best Cost-Benefit Analysis with a Microfoundation of Urban Agglomeration," ERSA conference papers ersa11p439, European Regional Science Association.
- Yoshitsugu Kanemoto, 2012. "Cost-Benefit Analysis in Monopolistic Competition Models of Urban Agglomeration," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-04, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
- Berg, Nathan, 2008. "Imitation in location choice," MPRA Paper 26592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ito, Junichi, 2002. "Why TVES have contributed to interregional imbalances in China:," EPTD discussion papers 91, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Tripathi, Sabyasachi, 2012. "Estimating Urban Agglomeration Economies for India: A New Economic Geography Perspective," MPRA Paper 43501, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- John Hartwick & Andrei Bazhanov, 2007. "On Beckmann's Dispersed "Interaction City"," Working Papers 1170, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Bazhanov, Andrei & Hartwick, John, 2006. "Dispersed Interactions of Urban Residents," MPRA Paper 766, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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