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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 433-459
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:10:y:1991:i:4:p:433-459

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