Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 8 (1974)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 235-247
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:8:y:1974:i:2:p:235-247

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research

Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Steven A. Matthews, 1991. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 950, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Björn Bartling & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2006. "The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents," Discussion Papers 115, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2003. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 216-240, March. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bentley MacLeod, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000036, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2008. "The Optimality of Simple Contracts: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse17_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
5. John Quiggin, 2001. "Production under Uncertainty and Choice under Uncertainty in the Emergence of Generalized Expected Utility Theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 125-144, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Hildreth, Clifford & Kislev, Yoav, 1980. "A Model Of Yield Variability And Price Effect," Staff Papers 13755, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Merton, Robert C., 1986. "Capital market theory and the pricing of financial securities," Working papers 1818-86., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Merton, Robert, 1990. "Capital market theory and the pricing of financial securities," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 497-581 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2006. "The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents," Discussion Papers in Economics 913, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.