Efficiency and Profit in the NYISO Transmission Congestion Contract Market
AbstractEvidence of speculator profit and TCC price less than congestion charges suggests that additional competition in the TCC auction should be encouraged as a way to increase efficiency and lower the price of this "insurance" for hedgers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal The Electricity Journal.
Volume (Year): 22 (2009)
Issue (Month): 9 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600875/description#description
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Adamson, Seabron & Noe, Thomas & Parker, Geoffrey, 2010. "Efficiency of financial transmission rights markets in centrally coordinated periodic auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 771-778, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.