Environmental Legislation and Enforcement: A Voting Model under Asymmetric Information
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 24 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
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- Häckner, Jonas & Herzing, Mathias, 2012. "When do Firms Break the Law in Order to Reduce Marginal Cost? - An Application to the Problem of Environmental Inspection," Research Papers in Economics 2012:11, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Lopez, Ramon & Mitra, Siddhartha, 2000. "Corruption, Pollution, and the Kuznets Environment Curve," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 137-150, September.
- Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "A penalty system to enforce policy measures under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 385-403, September.
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