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A new axiomatization of the shapley value

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  • Chun, Youngsub
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4CYGT0T-46/2/63f7b5d46c1e876c62f1d97644ef2c88
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 1 (1989)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 119-130

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:119-130

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    Cited by:
    1. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
    2. Casajus, André, 2014. "The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-4.
    3. Conrado Manuel & Enrique Gonzalez-Aranguena & Rene van den Brink|, 2012. "Players Indifferent to Cooperate and Characterizations of the Shapley Value," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-036/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. René van den Brink, 2004. "Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-127/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Rene van den Brink & Miklos Pinter, 2012. "On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-092/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Kongo, T. & Funaki, Y. & Tijs, S.H., 2007. "New Axiomatizations and an Implementation of the Shapley Value," Discussion Paper 2007-90, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Axioms of Invariance for TU-games," Working Papers 2012-01, CRESE.
    8. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2013. "A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance," Working Papers 2013-08, CRESE.
    9. Alexander Karpov, 2012. "Equal Weights Coauthorship Sharing and Shapley Value are Equivalen," HSE Working papers WP BRP 03/STI/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    10. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2012. "Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 255-270, May.
    11. Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Normative Microeconomics and the Social Contract," Working Papers 2001-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    12. Yan-An Hwang, 2006. "Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 557-568, December.
    13. Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2014. "Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: The difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 167-169.
    14. Khmelnitskaya, Anna B., 1999. "Marginalist and efficient values for TU games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 45-54, July.
    15. Maria Ekes, 2013. "Application of Generalized Owen Value for Voting Games in Partition Function Form," Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, issue 32, pages 43-53.
    16. Rene van den Brink & Miklos Pinter, 2012. "On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-092/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Conrado Manuel & Enrique Gonzalez-Aranguena & Rene van den Brink|, 2012. "Players Indifferent to Cooperate and Characterizations of the Shapley Value," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-036/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. André Casajus, 2011. "Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 163-174, August.

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