IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finlet/v59y2024ics1544612323011601.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Interlocked executives’ bad reputation in the labor market

Author

Listed:
  • Tang, Ning
  • Chen, Jianqiang
  • Lin, Chih-Yung
  • Tuan, Le Quoc

Abstract

This study investigates whether executives who concurrently hold director positions in other firms undergoing reputation-damaging incidents, such as fraud, are more likely to face forced turnovers. Using logistic regression with a matched sample, we find an increased likelihood of CEOs being replaced when their director-position interlocked firms go through negative events. The labor market further penalizes such executives, as the probability is lower for them to keep their current positions and gain new board seats in the future. The results are stronger for firms with higher external governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Tang, Ning & Chen, Jianqiang & Lin, Chih-Yung & Tuan, Le Quoc, 2024. "Interlocked executives’ bad reputation in the labor market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:59:y:2024:i:c:s1544612323011601
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2023.104788
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612323011601
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.frl.2023.104788?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate networks; Interlocking directorates; Managerial turnovers; Fraud; Ownership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:59:y:2024:i:c:s1544612323011601. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/frl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.