A canonical coalitional game model incorporating motivational psychology analysis for incentivizing stable direct energy trading in smart grid

While maximizing distributed energy value, direct electricity trading introduces strong interactive features, leading to conflicting interests among users. A key challenge is balancing user benefits and interests to encourage broad and sustainable prosumer participation. Motivation plays a vital role in driving human emotions and behaviors. This study incorporates motivational psychology to design an incentive scheme based on a canonical coalition game (CCG). By analyzing prosumers' psychological changes before energy trading, we develop corresponding incentive models for different psychological stages. The trading scheme must align with these model attributes to attract prosumer participation. Building upon canonical coalition game theory, we assess the feasibility of cooperation among prosumers and propose an edge-end coalitional trading scheme to reconcile conflicting interests. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed scheme satisfies motivational psychology model attributes, motivating active and sustainable prosumer engagement. We further investigate the coalition game model properties, rigorously proving superadditivity and non-empty core, ensuring prosumers consistently receive stable and fair profits. Case analysis reveals the grand coalition effectively enhances global payoffs. Furthermore, the proposed scheme facilitates peak shaving, valley filling, and on-site integration of renewable energy, promoting grid stability.