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Party affiliation, economic interests and U.S. governors’ renewable energy policies

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  • Bonnet, Paolo
  • Olper, Alessandro

Abstract

This paper explores the impact of U.S. state governors’ party affiliation and economic interests on renewable energy outcomes. Using data on installed renewable capacity, we find that, on average, Democratic governors had a positive impact on the state-level adoption of renewable energy. However, the effect is highly heterogeneous. There are no differences in renewable energy outcomes between Democratic and Republican governors in states where the energy-intensive manufacturing industries are economically important or in states where the natural renewable endowment is scarce. Consistent with a political economy approach, we argue that in the area of renewable and climate policy, governors’ policy preferences are overridden by holding office motivations and economic interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonnet, Paolo & Olper, Alessandro, 2024. "Party affiliation, economic interests and U.S. governors’ renewable energy policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:130:y:2024:i:c:s0140988323007570
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2023.107259
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    Keywords

    Renewable energy sources; Energy policy; Political parties; Economic interests; United States;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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