The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 24 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
- Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
- Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Working Papers 1302, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark C., 2009. "Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 35-57, July.
- Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 143-153, January.
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- Gehrlein, William V. & Moyouwou, Issofa & Lepelley, Dominique, 2013. "The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 352-365.
- Slinko, Arkadii, 2004. "How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 289-293, May.
- Geoffrey Pritchard & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 263-277, October.
- Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Working Papers halshs-00785366, HAL.
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