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Perfect competition in strategic market games with interlinked preferences

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  • Dubey, Pradeep
  • Shubik, Martin

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  • Dubey, Pradeep & Shubik, Martin, 1985. "Perfect competition in strategic market games with interlinked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 3-4.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:17:y:1985:i:1-2:p:3-4
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Dufwenberg & Paul Heidhues & Georg Kirchsteiger & Frank Riedel & Joel Sobel, 2011. "Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(2), pages 613-639.
    2. Martin Shubik, 1984. "Plausible Outcomes for Games in Strategic Form," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 714, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. M. Lombardi & S. Tonin, 2020. "On trade in bilateral oligopolies with altruistic and spiteful agents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 203-218, October.

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