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Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization

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  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Sun, Guang-Zhen

Abstract

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.

Suggested Citation

  • Ewerhart, Christian & Sun, Guang-Zhen, 2018. "Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 51-54.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:51-54
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.010
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Ewerhart, 2021. "A typology of military conflict based on the Hirshleifer contest," ECON - Working Papers 400, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Jamilla, Cristeta & Mendoza, Renier & Mező, István, 2020. "Solutions of neutral delay differential equations using a generalized Lambert W function," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 382(C).
    3. Christian Ewerhart & Guang-Zhen Sun, 2020. "The n-player Hirshleifer contest," ECON - Working Papers 361, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2023.
    4. Christian Ewerhart, 2022. "A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis," ECON - Working Papers 410, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised May 2023.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contests; Mixed-strategy equilibrium; Rent dissipation; Uniqueness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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