IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-07c70030.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof

Author

Listed:
  • Anne van den Nouweland

    (University of Oregon and The University of Melbourne)

Abstract

I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player's actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume3/EB-07C70030A.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bahel, Eric & Haller, Hans, 2013. "Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended Rock–Paper–Scissors games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 588-591.
    2. Bahel, Eric, 2012. "Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 401-403.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70030. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.