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The Role of Lender behavior in International Project Finance

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  • Sumru Altug

    ()
    (University of York and CEPR)

  • Murat Usman

    ()
    (Koc University)

  • Sule Ozler

    ()
    (University of California, Los Angeles)

Abstract

A sovereign borrower seeks to raise funds internationally to finance a fixed-size project, which no single lender can finance alone. Lenders cannot lend more than their endowments, which are private information. A coordination failure arises therefore, some socially desirable projects may not be financed, even if ex post feasible. There are multiple equilibria, and a conflict exists between lenders about which equilibrium to coordinate on. When endowments are volatile, some lenders prefer an equilibrium in which the project is financed with probability p

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2001/Volume28/EB-01AA0005A.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 28 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: A0

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01aa0005

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