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Multiple Large Shareholder Structure and Governance: The Role of Shareholder Numbers, Contest for Control, and Formal Institutions in Chinese Family Firms

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  • Luo, Jin-hui
  • Wan, Di-fang
  • Cai, Di
  • Liu, Heng

Abstract

The principal–principal (PP) perspective of corporate governance shows that multiple large shareholder (MLS) structure has competing monitoring and entrenchment governance effects. We argue that the dominant effect depends on contest for control among large shareholders and the number of large shareholders involved. Using data from Chinese family listed companies from 2004 to 2007, this study shows inverse U-shaped relationships between contest for control and corporate market value, as measured by Tobin's Q, and between the number of large shareholders and corporate market value. Findings indicate that at low to medium levels of contest for control or number of large shareholders, formal institutions can strengthen MLS structure's monitoring effect and can help this effect last longer. As a whole, the findings extend the institution-based view in the context of family corporate governance by showing that formal institutions can shape the ability of MLS structure to exert governance.

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  • Luo, Jin-hui & Wan, Di-fang & Cai, Di & Liu, Heng, 2013. "Multiple Large Shareholder Structure and Governance: The Role of Shareholder Numbers, Contest for Control, and Formal Institutions in Chinese Family Firms," Management and Organization Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 265-294, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:maorev:v:9:y:2013:i:02:p:265-294_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Jing Zhao & Michael Carney & Shubo Zhang & Limin Zhu, 2020. "How does an intra-family succession effect strategic change and performance in China’s family firms?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 363-389, June.
    2. Jin-hui Luo & Xue Li & Linda C. Wang & Yue Liu, 2021. "Owner type, pyramidal structure and R&D Investment in China’s family firms," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 1085-1111, September.
    3. Xibo Zhao & Dan Yang & Zhengguang Li & Lynda Song, 2021. "Multiple large shareholders and corporate fraud: evidence from China," Frontiers of Business Research in China, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 1-21, December.
    4. Haroon ur Rashid Khan & Waqas Bin Khidmat & Sadia Awan, 2021. "Board diversity, financial flexibility and corporate innovation: evidence from China," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 11(2), pages 303-326, June.
    5. Jin-hui Luo & Yuangao Xiang & Ruichao Zhu, 2017. "Military top executives and corporate philanthropy: Evidence from China," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 725-755, September.
    6. Carney, Michael & Zhao, Jing & Zhu, Limin, 2019. "Lean innovation: Family firm succession and patenting strategy in a dynamic institutional landscape," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4).
    7. Du, Shanzhong & Ma, Lianfu & Li, Zhuo, 2022. "Non-family shareholder governance and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from Chinese family-controlled businesses," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 156-170.
    8. Helen Wei Hu & Pei Sun, 2019. "What determines the severity of tunneling in China?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 161-184, March.
    9. Xu, Kai & Hitt, Michael A. & Dai, Li, 2020. "International diversification of family-dominant firms: Integrating socioemotional wealth and behavioral theory of the firm," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 55(3).

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