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Can auctions help reduce mandatory pension fund fees?

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  • KURACH, RADOSŁAW
  • KUŚMIERCZYK, PAWEŁ
  • PAPLA, DANIEL

Abstract

Companies that manage mandatory pension funds are frequently accused of excessive fee taking. International analyses have found that in countries with legal caps, commissions remain within these caps; hence, market competition does not function. Surprisingly, there are few international cases where local regulators implement mechanisms to facilitate competition. The variety of auction mechanisms available raises the question of whether an optimal solution exists for this purpose. Therefore, in this study, we present evidence, based on a controlled regulatory experiment, on the fee-reduction potential of reverse auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurach, Radosław & Kuśmierczyk, Paweł & Papla, Daniel, 2019. "Can auctions help reduce mandatory pension fund fees?," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 190-219, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jpenef:v:18:y:2019:i:02:p:190-219_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernal, Noelia & Olivera, Javier, 2020. "Choice of pension management fees and effects on pension wealth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 539-568.

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