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Enforcing Property Rights Through Reputation: Mexico'S Early Industrialization, 1878 1913

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  • Maurer, Noel
  • Sharma, Tridib

Abstract

Mexico s initial industrialization was based on firms that were grouped : that is, linked to other firms through close affiliations with a common bank. Most explanations for the prevalence of groups are based on increasing returns or missing formal capital markets. We propose a simpler explanation that better fits the facts of Mexican history. In the absence of secure property rights, tangible collateral could not credibly be offered to creditors; but there remained the possibility of using reputation as a form of intangible collateral. In such circumstances, firms had incentives to group together for purposes of mutual monitoring and insurance.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal The Journal of Economic History.

Volume (Year): 61 (2001)
Issue (Month): 04 (December)
Pages: 950-973

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Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:61:y:2001:i:04:p:950-973_04

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Cited by:
  1. Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, 2007. "Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(2), pages 331-372, June.
  2. Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
  3. Noel Maurer & Stephen Haber, 2007. "Related Lending: Manifest Looting or Good Governance? Lessons from the Economic History of Mexico," NBER Chapters, in: The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises, pages 213-242 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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